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HOW THE U.S. SUPREME COURT DEEMED THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION GRAND
BARGAIN “ADEQUATE” WITHOUT DEFINING ADEQUACY
Michael C. Duff**
I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the chief issues in the workers’ compensation legal regime is the adequacy of workers’
compensation benefits.1 Certainly, there are struggles over the costs to employers of providing
workers’ compensation insurance for the coverage of workplace injuries, but those costs have been
going down.2 Workplaces have in general become safer, which probably explains the decline.3
When one sees workers’ compensation in the news these days, it is most often in connection with
scandalous fraud or outrageous, if sometimes anecdotal, stories of undercompensation which
generate allegations of unconstitutional benefit inadequacy.4 The workers’ compensation “Grand
Bargain” or quid pro quo—the exchange of common law tort rights to damages (and defenses) for
statutory workers’ compensation rights to benefits and tort immunity—was purportedly
constitutionally premised on a notion of reasonable workers’ compensation benefits.5 Implicit in
the exchange was that some tort law beneficiaries (both defendants and plaintiffs) were giving up,
ex ante, what would have matured into ascertainable tort damages (or defenses).6 Other workers’
compensation statutory beneficiaries would receive windfalls as the victims of pure accident
(claimants) or as the perpetrators of negligent harms (employers). Nevertheless, the question of
benefit adequacy is important to those directly impacted by injury and can assume heightened
**Professor of Law; University of Wyoming College of Law. B.A. 1991 West Chester University of Pennsylvania;
J.D. 1995, Harvard Law School.
For an entertaining introductory podcast see Alan S. Pierce, Are Workers’ Comp Benefits Adequate?, Workers
Comp Matters, Legal Talk Network (Peter Rousmaniere – Guest) available at
https://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/workers-comp-matters/2017/02/workers-comp-benefits-adequate/
2
Employer costs have fluctuated, rising during the Great Recession but then recently declining to historically low
levels. See WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: BENEFITS, COVERAGE, AND COSTS, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL
INSURANCE available at https://www.nasi.org/research/2017/report-workers%E2%80%99-compensation-benefitscoverage-costs-%E2%80%93-2015.
3
See Louise Esola, Comp Rates Set to Continue Downward Trend in 2018, BUSINESS INSURANCE, October 11, 2017
available at https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20171011/NEWS08/912316461/Workers-compensationrates-set-to-continue-downward-trend-in-2018. The reader will note the discrepancy between falling carrier rates and
rising employer costs. A full discussion of the phenomenon is beyond the scope of this article but has very interesting
implications for the future of workers’ compensation.
4
See Michael Grabell and Howard Berkes, The Demolition of Workers’ Comp, PROPUBLICA, March 4, 2015 available
at https://www.propublica.org/article/the-demolition-of-workers-compensation (highlighting benefit inadequacy
through statistics and case studies). There are exceptions, however. See Michael Grabell and Howard Berkes, Inside
Corporate America’s Campaign to Ditch Workers’ Comp, PROPUBLICA, Oct. 14, 2015 available at
https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-corporate-americas-plan-to-ditch-workers-comp
(featuring corporate
attempts to eliminate statutory requirements to provide workers’ compensation benefits).
5
See infra. at Part II.
6
This problem was dealt with in a view very early compensation statutes by allowing an employee to elect a negligence
action where an injury had obviously resulted from an employer’s personal negligence. See e.g. Sec. 2 of the original
Kansas Workers’ Compensation Act, L. 1911, C.000; but was very quickly dispensed with as statutes continued to be
enacted in the 1910s. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION STATUTES
OF THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES, Bulletin No. 203 (1917)
1
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societal importance whenever it is proposed that workers’ compensation principles be exported to
other legal environments – for example, to the medical malpractice tort regime.7
In the Rawlsian sense, the workers’ compensation compromise was worked out behind a veil
of ignorance because no one could know, in advance, the identities of future winners and losers
under the new law.8 Still, that there would be winners and losers no one could have doubted.
Possession of a tort right was, and is, mere potentiality until the right is exercised, and speaking
about “exchanges” of rights in the abstract is awkward. Yet exchanges of entire categories of rights
is how the workers’ compensation quid pro quo is typically conceived,9 and this article will
continue to speak within that framework.
The focus of this article is primarily limited to exploring how the workers’ compensation
founders thought about benefit adequacy rather than assessing whether present benefits are in fact
adequate. But the question of whether workers’ compensation benefits were originally reasonable
often becomes intertwined with assessments of their current reasonableness or adequacy. As
mentioned, under the original workers’ compensation bargain, employees who might have been
bona fide tort victims were limited to workers’ compensation benefits, both indemnity payments
for lost wages, and payment for medical expense10 resulting from work-related injuries. One
measure of the reasonableness of workers’ compensation benefits might therefore be the extent to
which they corresponded (or continue to correspond) to the expected value of foregone tort
damages. The problem with this measure is that most negligence cases are imperfect; they will
yield something less than the theoretical maximum value of a given claim.11 In addition to
complications associated with calculating the expected values of specific litigated cases, there are
valuation problems across legal epochs. As jurisdictions have dispensed with all-or-nothing
negligence defenses—contributory negligence and assumption of the risk,12 part of13 the “unholy
trinity,” affirmative-defense-death-knell of many work injuries under the old tort regime14—the
original valuation of cases across a range of possible values has probably changed. The “value” of
See Alexander Volokh, Medical Malpractice as Workers’ Comp: Overcoming State Constitutional Barriers to Tort
Reform, 67 EMORY L. J. 975 (2018).
8
See Original Position, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Part 3 (2014) available at
9
For a recent example see Johnson v. U.S. Food Service, slip op. n.116483 (August 3, 2018) available at
http://www.kscourts.org/Cases-and-Opinions/opinions/CtApp/2018/20180803/117725.pdf (striking on its face
section of Kansas workers’ compensation statute calculating partial benefits in a manner likely to produce lower
benefits in violation of the quid pro quo under Kansas law).
10
Though in the very earliest statutes some states did not provide for payment of medical expense at all, some states
provided only very limited medical benefits (more like first aid) for a short period of time immediately following a
work-related injury 9a maximum of perhaps 60 days), some states paid medical benefits only in the case of the death
of the injured worker, and in all cases where medical benefits were paid they were strictly capped. See HARRY B.
BRADBURY, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION AND STATE INSURANCE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 197-201 (The Banks
Law Publishing 1912).
11
According to the standard model, “the value of a lawsuit is the probability of the plaintiffs’ victory multiplied by
the amount to be won, minus transaction costs.” John Bronstein, Some Thoughts About the Economics of Settlement,
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1129, 1137 (2009); see generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suits with Negative Expected Value,
Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law and Economics, Discussion Paper No. 226 12/1997, as published in 3 The New
Palgrave
Dictionary
of
Economics
and
the
Law
551-554
(1998)
available
at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/pdfs/Negative-Expected-Value-Suit.pdf.
12
See Marianne M. Jennings, The Impact of Alternative Negligence Defense Rules on Litigation Behavior and Tort
Claim Disposition, 5 BYU J. PUB. L. 33 (1991).
13
The third such defense was the fellow-servant rule—the employer was not vicariously liable to an employee for
the negligence of a co-employee.
14
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 526-527 (4th ed. 1971).
7
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a tort claim should probably rise, arguably necessitating a “reopener” of the quid pro quo.15 In a
similar vein, the concept of an “accident” may also change over time as the idea of foreseeability
changes. Accidents (and plaintiffs) in the 21st century may be foreseeable in a way that would not
have been possible in the early twentieth century,16 when workers’ compensation statutes
originated. On the other hand, cumulative, or gradual, injuries of a kind probably not under
contemplation at the time of the original quid pro quo, but sometimes covered under the current
workers’ compensation regime,17 would be difficult to conceive under a foreseeability-based tort
regime.18 Any reconfiguration of the workers’ compensation structure taking these modern
variables into account would doubtless require mind-bogglingly complex actuarial assessment. In
any event, as some plaintiffs have been arguing,19 given the immense shift represented by the
establishment of a comparative negligence regime, it is plausible that employees would never have
agreed to the tradeoff.20
Nevertheless, with respect to the victims of pure accident, the same conversation is inapt.
Because these victims would not have been compensated under the tort regime of 1911,21 it is not
possible to persuasively argue that any level of workers’ compensation benefits is “legally”
unreasonable. For this category of employees, workers’ compensation, almost by definition,
functions as a form of social insurance.22 Although this awkward conflation of beneficiaries is
ubiquitous, the way it impacts workers’ compensation policy discussions is usually not
acknowledged.

15

See Padgett v. State, No. 11-13661 CA 25, 2014 WL 6685226 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 13, 2014) (dismissed on procedural
grounds) (trial judge arguing reopener theory).
16
See Meiring de Villiers, Foreseeability Decoded, 16 MINN. J. LAW, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 343, 344-345 (2015).
(discussing changing notions of foreseeability as technology and scientific knowledge advance).
17
Carpal tunnel syndrome is a good example. See generally 4 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 50.01.
18
See generally Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v. Morts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd (Wagon Mound No. 1) [1961]
UKPC 2, [1961] AC 388; [1961] 1 All ER 404 (18 January 1961) (holding tort damages not available in absence of
foreseeability of type of damage plaintiff suffered). That cumulative injuries were not contemplated is suggested by
the very limited duration of medical care provided under the earliest American workers’ compensation statutes. See
generally infra. Part III.
19
See brief of plaintiffs’ or their amici in Vasquez v. Dillard’s Inc., 381 P.3d 768 (Okl. 2016) brief at 2016 WL
6277356; and Stahl v. Hialeah Hospital, 182 So.3d 635 (Fla. 2015) brief at 2015 WL 6951096.
20
Assuming one believes there was ever truly broad employee assent. Scholars have persuasively made the case that
installation of the workers’ compensation regime represented a multilateral agreement between various stakeholders.
See generally PRICE V. FISHBACK AND SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE: THE ORIGINS
OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (University of Chicago Press, 2007). But unions were weak—union density was
roughly 5.5% in 1910 (roughly 2 million workers out of a working population of 38 million were union members, see
LEO WOLMAN, UNION MEMBERSHIP IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
RESEARCH, Bulletin 68 (1937) available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5410.pdf ), and the then-voluntarist
organized labor leaders instinctively opposed social insurance and only grudgingly accepted workers’ compensation
because they felt it could not be properly negotiated—as they argued it should be—within collective bargaining
agreements. Robert Asher, The Ignored Precedent: Samuel Gompers and Workers’ Compensation, NEW LABOR
REVIEW (Fall 1982).
21
The year that comprehensive state workers’ compensation systems were first enacted. See generally infra. Part III.
22
For this reason, it seems technically inaccurate to refer to workers’ compensation generally as a form of social
insurance. Compare H. ALLAN HUNT & MARCUS DILLENDER, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, ANALYSIS FOR ITS
SECOND CENTURY, W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE FOR EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH (Kalamazoo 2017) available at
http://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1262&context=up_press.
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Social insurance analyses of benefit adequacy often frankly admit the absence of consensus on
the meaning of benefit inadequacy.23 Social insurance analysts also recognize the paucity of raw
data relating to workers’ compensation benefits in the United States that is easily accessible to
academic researchers. Over the last thirty years, for example, it appears that few comparative
empirical studies of benefit levels have been completed by only a handful of academic social
science researchers.24 Despite this shortcoming, in the evolution of workers’ compensation
benefits, major competing theories of benefit adequacy have emerged.25 The study and articulation
of these theories is important; but the present inquiry is more narrowly focused. In this article, the
inquiry will be what early architects of workers’ compensation statutes meant by benefit adequacy.
While society is not necessarily bound by what those architects thought, understanding what the
essential workers’ compensation social contract was once understood to mean should inform
present discussions of benefit adequacy.26
The difficulty with such an inquiry, however, is that early American courts made few attempts
to explain why workers compensation benefit levels, purportedly established as a quid pro quo for
tort damages, were reasonable. Part II of this article analyzes some of the decisions issued by those
early courts, and highlights language from the decisions showing that the reasonableness of
workers’ compensation benefits then under consideration was presumed but never explained. Part
III of the article explores early American workers’ compensation policy analyses by various
private and public-sector stakeholders—beginning in 1909—that were inspired by an investigative
team sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation,27 and initiated by the Minnesota Employees’
Compensation Commission.28 Those investigators studied European workers’ compensation
H. ALLAN HUNT, ADEQUACY OF EARNINGS REPLACEMENT IN WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, A REPORT
OF THE STUDY PANEL ON BENEFIT ADEQUACY OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION STEERING COMMITTEE 19-23,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE (W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 2004).
23

24

Cullinan, and Curington (1979) (interviewing claimants in California, Florida, New York, Washington, and
Wisconsin); California Workers’ Compensation Institute (1984) (interviewing California claimants); Berkowitz and
Burton (1987) (analyzed wage replacement performance in three states Wisconsin, California, and Florida using injury
samplings from 1968); Boden and Galizzi (1999) (comparing injured Wisconsin workers who missed more than one
week of work in 1989–1990 to workers with less severe injuries who missed less than one week of work); Peterson et
al. (1998) and Reville (1999) (studied replacement rates for PPD claimants in California by matching workers injured
in 1993–1994 to uninjured workers employed at the same firm and with similar preinjury wages); Biddle (1998)
(estimated lost wages for seriously injured workers in the state of Washington by comparing workers injured in 1993–
1994 who received indemnity (wage loss) payments in the 3.5 years after an injury to those who had medical-only
claims); Reville et al. (2001) (evaluating the benefit adequacy of workers’ compensation for PPD claimants in New
Mexico by comparing replacement rates for PPD claimants in New Mexico in 1994–1998 to PPD claimants in
California, Wisconsin, Washington, and Oregon over the same period; Hunt (2004) (reviewing the preceding studies);
Seabury et al. (2014) (studying New Mexico workers’ compensation claims with injury dates from 1994 to 2000. This
study linked back to the early Berkowitz and Burton study by utilizing federal data from the Internal Revenue Service
and Social Security Administration rather than state unemployment insurance data to determine earning); Dworsky et
al. (2016) (studying trends in earnings losses and workers’ compensation benefits paid before, during, and after the
“Great Recession” in California).
25
HUNT, ADEQUACY OF EARNINGS REPLACEMENT IN WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS 19-23.
26
On reimagining the social contract see generally Josh Friedman and Michael Lind, The Past and Future of
America's Social Contract, THE ATLANTIC, December 19, 2013 available at
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/12/the-past-and-future-of-americas-social-contract/282511/.
27
LEE K. FRANKEL AND MILES M. DAWSON, WORKINGMEN’S INSURANCE IN EUROPE (Russell Sage Foundation
Publications 1910) available at
https://www.russellsage.org/sites/default/files/Frankel.Dawson.Dublin_Workingmen_0.pdf.
28
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS,
Atlantic City, New Jersey (July 29-31, 1909).
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systems, some of which had already been substantially in place for a quarter-century prior to the
enactment of the first American workers’ compensation statutes in 1910-1911.29 A second similar
investigation and analysis was conducted roughly two years later by the National Association of
Manufacturers.30 This article concludes31 that already existing international workers’
compensation systems, especially the German and English systems, and close American expert
policy scrutiny of those systems, persuaded the U.S. Supreme Court to “defer” on the question of
employee benefit levels, without discussion, to experts involved in creation of New York’s second
attempt at a workers’ compensation act32 during the height of the Lochner era.33 In retrospect, the
Court may have been extending its conceptions of state police power to allow for a form of rational
basis review of industry-consensual resolution of a “technical” problem.34 From the perspective of
employee benefits, the Court itself declined to articulate any specific workers’ compensation
standards necessary to maintain the constitutionality of the workers’ compensation system under
the United States Constitution. At most, the Court suggested the existence of a benefit floor, and
held that the statutes it was reviewing had not fallen beneath that floor.

II.

BENEFIT ADEQUACY AS REASONABLENESS AND THE PROBLEM OF NEGATIVE
IMPLICATION

In the early part of the 20th century, in response to an epidemic of workplace injuries
occasioned by the intensifying industrial revolution,35 states began to experiment with supplanting
tort law with workers’ compensation law. The experiment was not new.36 Similar developments
had been unfolding in Europe since about 1875.37 This Part discusses court challenges to the
implementation of workers’ compensation in the United States.
A. From Ives to White

29

See infra. Part III.
See infra. Part III.
31
See infra. Part III.
32
See infra. Part III.
33
See David A. Strauss, Why was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 374 (2003) (discussing a common view
that the U.S. Supreme Court, as reflected in its Lochner opinion, “treated rights defined by the common law of
contracts as constituting a natural, ‘pre-political’ state of affairs and refused to recognize that those rights are as much
the product of state action as the regulatory statutes the Court was invalidating”). The Court decided Lochner in 1905.
See 198 U.S. 45. Yet the 1917-1922 workers’ compensation decisions seem quite willing to interfere with private
contracts between employers and employees. See generally infra. Part II.
34
For discussion of the evolution of “police power” rationality review see Thomas v. Nachbar, The Rationality of
Rational Basis Review, 102 VIRGINIA L. REV. 1627, 1640-41 (2016).
35
Mark Aldrich, History of Workplace Safety in the United States, 1880-1970, EH.NET available at
https://eh.net/encyclopedia/history-of-workplace-safety-in-the-united-states-1880-1970-2/.
36
See infra. Part III.
37
FRANKEL AND DAWSON, WORKINGMEN’S INSURANCE IN EUROPE at 74 (discussing partial implementation in 1875
of workers’ compensation principles applicable to railway and steamship companies in Switzerland).
30
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In Ives v. South Buffalo Railway Co.,38 the New York Court of Appeals struck as
unconstitutional an early New York workers’ compensation statute.39 While not quibbling with the
police power authority of the state to correct social evils,40 the Court found that, by imposing upon
employers liability without fault for employee workplace injuries, the statute “plainly
constitute[ed] a deprivation of liberty and property under the federal and state Constitutions . . .”41
According to the Court, “‘Process of law’ in its broad sense means law in its regular course of
administration through courts of justice, and that is but another way of saying that every man's
right to life, liberty, and property is to be disposed of in accordance with those ancient and
fundamental principles which were in existence when our Constitutions were adopted.”42 Thus,
Ives presumed the existence of “ancient and fundamental principles” predating the U.S. and New
York constitutions, and appeared to assume that the 14th amendment of the U.S. Constitution
incorporated those principles in the formula “due process of law.”43 The day after Ives was decided,
the infamous Triangle Shirt Waist fire killed approximately one-hundred and fifty workers in New
York City.44 The publicity in connection with the fire is often regarded as a significant motivating
factor for subsequent amendment of the New York Constitution to allow for enactment of a second
workers’ compensation statute.45 The constitutional amendment provided in relevant part:
Nothing contained in this constitution shall be construed to limit the power of the
legislature to enact laws . . . for the payment . . . of compensation for injuries to
employees or for death of employees resulting from such injuries without regard to
fault as a cause thereof . . . or to provide that the right of such compensation, and
the remedy therefor shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies for injuries
to employees or for death resulting from such injuries.46
Thus, the state law constitutional basis for Ives’ invalidation of the New York workers’
compensation act was removed, while federal constitutional questions had yet to be resolved.
The impact of Ives throughout the United States was significant. Seven states, including New
York, “went so far as to amend their constitutions to make unquestionably certain that
compensation legislation would be legal.”47 In 1911, several states were already “drafting workers’
compensation statutes and nine of them, in reaction to Ives, decided to create non-compulsory laws
permitting employers to elect whether to participate in workers’ compensation systems.” 48 While
some commentators have believed that Ives did not in reality represent the majority of legal and

38

94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
In 1910, New York passed two workers’ compensation statutes, a voluntary statute applicable to all employments
and a compulsory statute applicable only to ultrahazardous employment. FISHBACK & KANTOR, PRELUDE TO THE
WELFARE STATE, supra. at 102. It was obviously the compulsory statute that was contentious.
40
Id. at 437.
41
Id. at 439.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
PETER M. LENCIS, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: A REFERENCE AND GUIDE (Westport, CT 1998).
45
Id. at 12; HERMAN MILES SOMERS AND ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION, PREVENTION,
INSURANCE AND REHABILITATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY 32 (John Wiley & Sons 1954).
46
Art. 1, Section 19 of the New York Constitution (1914) quoted in id. at 12.
47
SOMERS AND SOMERS, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION, supra. 45, at 32. The states were Arizona, California, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wyoming. Id.
48
SOMERS AND SOMERS at 32.
39
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judicial opinion at the time, New York’s court of last resort nevertheless exerted substantial
influence over state legislatures.49
Whereas Ives had been employer-centric in its focus—discussing almost exclusively whether
a state had the constitutional power to bind employers to compulsory workers’ compensation
laws— the second major workers’ compensation constitutional case arising in New York, New
York Cent. R. Co. v. White,50 discussed the common-law rights of both employers and employees.51
The employer appealed the underlying workers’ compensation award, rendered in favor of the
family of a deceased employee,52 on much the same grounds as had been the case in Ives.53 On
this occasion, however, the issues were purely federal and decided by the United States Supreme
Court rather than the New York Court of Appeals.54 Just as the New York courts had in Ives, the
Id. at 32, n.28. Between 1911 and 1917, when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld compulsory workers’ compensation
statutes in White, see infra. at n.5061 and accompanying text, the following states enacted elective, rather than
compulsory, statutes: Kansas (1911), Massachusetts (1911), New Hampshire (1911), New Jersey (1911), Wisconsin
(1911), Michigan (1912), Rhode Island (1912), Connecticut (1913), Iowa (1913), Minnesota (1913), Nebraska (1913),
Nevada (1913), Oregon (1913), Texas (1913), West Virginia (1913), Louisiana (1914), Kentucky (1914), Colorado
(1915), Indiana (1915), Maine (1915), Montana (1915), Pennsylvania (1915), Vermont (1915), Delaware (1917), and
South Dakota 1917. After 1917, the eight states enacting elective statutes were located in the South: Virginia (1918),
Alabama (1919), Tennessee (1919), Missouri (1919), Georgia (1920), North Carolina (1929), Florida (1935), and
South Carolina (1935). FISHBACK AND KANTOR, PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE supra.at 103-104. Of these states,
only Texas remains elective.
50
243 U.S. 188 (1917). The administrative decision below affirming the workers’ compensation award of benefits was
upheld in the New York appellate courts without opinion in light of the intervening amendment of the state constitution
and the subsequent upholding of the Act under the amended constitution in Jensen v. Southern Pac. Co., 109 N.E. 600
(N.Y. 1915) rev’d on other grounds 244 U.S. 205.
51
The railroad appealed on the theories that liability was exclusively governed by the Federal Employers’ Liability
Act and that the workers’ compensation award “would deprive plaintiff in error of its property without due process of
law, and deny to it the equal protection of the laws, in contravention of the 14th Amendment.” Id. at 191. With respect
to employees, the Court said,
49

In considering the constitutional question, it is necessary to view the matter from the standpoint of
the employee as well as from that of the employer. For, while plaintiff in error is an employer, and
cannot succeed without showing that its rights as such are infringed . . . yet . . . the exemption from
further liability is an essential part of the scheme, so that the statute, if invalid as against the
employee, is invalid as against the employer.
Id. at 197 (internal cites omitted).
52
Id. at 191.
53
Id. See supra. n.38 and 39 and accompanying text.
54
Id. at 196-197:
The scheme of the act is so wide a departure from common-law standards respecting the
responsibility of employer to employee that doubts naturally have been raised respecting its
constitutional validity. The adverse considerations urged or suggested in this case and in kindred
cases submitted at the same time are: (a) That the employer's property is taken without due process
of law, because he is subjected to a liability for compensation without regard to any neglect or
default on his part or on the part of any other person for whom he is responsible, and in spite of the
fact that the injury may be solely attributable to the fault of the employee; (b) that the employee's
rights are interfered with, in that he is prevented from having compensation for injuries arising from
the employer's fault commensurate with the damages actually sustained, and is limited to the
measure of compensation prescribed by the act; and (c) that both employer and employee are
deprived of their liberty to acquire property by being prevented from making such agreement as
they choose respecting the terms of the employment.
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U.S. Supreme Court considered the involved employers’ property rights.55 But the Supreme Court
also analyzed the question of deprivation of employee tort remedies in exchange for workers’
compensation benefits. The Supreme Court noted that it had already “upheld the authority of the
states to establish by legislation departures from the fellow-servant rule and other common-law
rules affecting the employer's liability for personal injuries to the employee.” 56 Such departures,
while justified, were limited,57 and it was unnecessary:
. . . for the purposes of the present case, to say that a state might, without violence
to the constitutional guaranty of ‘due process of law,’ suddenly set aside all
common-law rules respecting liability as between employer and employee, without
providing a reasonably just substitute. Considering the vast industrial organization
of the state of New York, for instance, with hundreds of thousands of plants and
millions of wage earners, each employer, on the one hand, having embarked his
capital, and each employee, on the other, having taken up his particular mode of
earning a livelihood, in reliance upon the probable permanence of an established
body of law governing the relation, it perhaps may be doubted whether the state
could abolish all rights of action, on the one hand, or all defenses, on the other,
without setting up something adequate in their stead. No such question is here
presented, and we intimate no opinion upon it.58
For the Court, no such question was presented because,
. . . it is not unreasonable for the state, while relieving the employer from
responsibility for damages measured by common-law standards and payable in
cases where he or those for whose conduct he is answerable are found to be at fault,
to require him to contribute a reasonable amount, and according to a reasonable and
definite scale, by way of compensation for the loss of earning power incurred in the
common enterprise, irrespective of the question of negligence, instead of leaving
the entire loss to rest where it may chance to fall, that is, upon the injured employee
or his dependents. Nor can it be deemed arbitrary and unreasonable, from the
standpoint of the employee's interest, to supplant a system under which he assumed
the entire risk of injury in ordinary cases, and in others had a right to recover an
amount more or less speculative upon proving facts of negligence that often were
difficult to prove, and substitute a system under which, in all ordinary cases of
accidental injury, he is sure of a definite and easily ascertained compensation, not
being obliged to assume the entire loss in any case, but in all cases assuming any
loss beyond the prescribed scale.59
None of this was to say,

55

Id.
Id. at 200.
57
Id. at 201.
58
Id. The implication is that the New York system then before the Supreme Court was clearly adequate.
59
Id. at 203-204.
56

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3238456

that any scale of compensation, however insignificant, on the one hand, or onerous,
on the other, would be supportable. In this case, no criticism is made on the ground
that the compensation prescribed by the statute in question is unreasonable in
amount, either in general or in the particular case. Any question of that kind may
be met when it arises.60
One especially underappreciated aspect of White is its characterization of the state’s interest in
preservation of “personal security.” Against the employers’ arguments respecting their interests,
grounded in property and contract, the Court said,
The subject matter in respect of which freedom of contract is restricted is the matter
of compensation for human life or limb lost or disability incurred in the course of
hazardous employment, and the public has a direct interest in this as affecting the
common welfare. ‘The whole is no greater than the sum of all the parts, and when
the individual health, safety, and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the state must
suffer.’ It cannot be doubted that the state may prohibit and punish self-maiming
and attempts at suicide; it may prohibit a man from bartering away his life or his
personal security; indeed, the right to these is often declared, in bills of rights, to
be ‘natural and inalienable;’ and the authority to prohibit contracts made in
derogation of a lawfully-established policy of the state respecting compensation for
accidental death or disabling personal injury is equally clear.61
Thus, the Supreme Court described life and personal security as inalienable rights that a state
could justifiably prioritize over rights of contract and property depending on the circumstances.
This emphasis on inalienability, when read in proper context, explained why the state could
prohibit contracts that would waive rights to any remedy for personal injury.
B. Murky Judicial Negative Implications Not Clarified
White has never been overruled,62 but has often been understood in terms of what it claimed
not to be saying. It represents, in other words, a species of negative pregnant, or rather a series of
negative pregnant statements. A negative pregnant is a “denial implying its affirmative opposite
by seeming to deny only a qualification of the allegation and not the allegation itself.” 63 The series
included the following propositions:
1) It is unnecessary to say that a state might (without triggering due process
concerns) set aside all rules of employer-employee liability without providing
a “reasonably just substitute”64
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Id.
Id. at 206-207.
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The due process-quid pro quo principle White appears to stand for remains an arguably open question at the U.S.
Supreme Court. Not much seems to have changed since the Court’s decision in Fein v. Permanente Medical Group
474 U.S. 892 (1985), where Justice White made this claim. (White, J., dissenting). Indeed, that is largely the point of
this article.
63
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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See supra. n.58 and accompanying text.
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2) It perhaps may be doubted whether the state could abolish all rights of action,
on the one hand, or all defenses, on the other, without setting up something
adequate in their stead.65
3) None of this was to say, that any scale of compensation, however insignificant,
on the one hand, or onerous, on the other, would be supportable.66
The Supreme Court apparently denied that an “unreasonably” unjust, inadequate, or
sufficiently insignificant remedy was provided under the New York statute, but implicit in the
denial was the affirmative opposite of the proposition. If, generally, a substitute remedy was unjust,
or inadequate, or insignificant then the state’s actions might violate due process, be subject to
doubt, or be insupportable.
The problem, of course, is how to interpret such statements now given the evolution of
constitutional doctrine. When White has been mentioned in modern quid pro quo theory cases,67
for example in two “Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act” cases,68 the usual response by
courts is to say that it is not clear that a quid pro quo for deprivation of tort rights is constitutionally
required but, even if it is, the statute in question provides adequate substitute tort remedies.69 That
reasoning is circular without a baseline, however, and in the absence of defining adequacy such
utterances are conclusory. Courts might, of course, simply say that White is archaic and should be
abandoned; but they do not seem quite willing to do so. The problem with simply abandoning
White in workers’ compensation contexts is that it is often regarded as the Rosetta Stone to original
constitutional justification for workers’ compensation writ large. On some level, it has always
seemed to offend legal sensibilities to agree that a legislature could establish any substantive
parameters it wished.70 The proposition leads too easily to the possibility that a state legislature
could eliminate injury remedies altogether. This is simply another face of the perennial tort reform
debate on constitutional boundaries,71 and it is natural to read White as forestalling such an
outcome. One has difficulty reading White without receiving the strong impression that the
Supreme Court conditioned the quid pro quo on the availability of adequate or reasonable
substitute remedies.
In a case nearly contemporaneous with White, and again arising in the context of hazardous
employment, Mountain Timber Co. v. State of Washington,72 the Court took up the question of
employee benefits, though, as in White, it was the employer who had raised the question of the
constitutionality of the statute,
While plaintiff in error is an employer, and cannot succeed without showing that
its constitutional rights as employer are infringed . . . yet it is evident that the
65

Id.
See supra. n.60.
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As of this writing research revealed five such cases: Wood v. Central Sand & Gravel Co., 33 F.Supp. 40 (W.D.
Tenn. 1940); Lash v. State, 14 So.2d. 229 (Ala. 1943); Lash v. State, 14 So.2d. 235 (Ala. 1943); Ileto v. Glock, Inc.
565 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2009); and Gilland v. Sportsmen’s Outpost, Inc., WL 2479693 (Conn.Super.Ct. 2011).
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See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., and Gilland v. Sportsmen’s Outpost, Inc., supra. n.67.
69
This was precisely the approach taken in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59,
88, n.32 (1978).
70
See T.R.S. Allan, Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism, 44 Cambridge L.
J. 111 (1985) (distinguishing legislative supremacy from “the rule of law”).
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See generally Alexander Volokh, Medical Malpractice as Workers’ Comp, supra. n7.
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243 U.S. 219 (1917). In fact, the employee benefits available under the Washington statute differed substantially
from those available under the New York statute. See infra. at n.185 and accompanying text.
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employer’s exemption from liability to private action is an essential part of the
legislative scheme and the quid pro quo for the burdens imposed upon him, so that
if the act is not valid as against employees, it is not valid as against employers . . .
However, so far as the interests of employees and their dependents are concerned,
this act is not distinguishable in any point raising a constitutional difficulty from
the New York Workmen's Compensation Act, sustained in [White].73
Thus, the two 1917 foundational cases upholding compulsory workers’ compensation systems,
as applied to hazardous employment, offered little indication of how reasonableness or adequacy
was to be assessed apart from vaguely approving as adequate the statutory structure then under
consideration.74 It is perhaps surprising that the Court bothered to justify state workers’
compensation statutes at all, for courts had repeatedly pointed out that no one had a vested right in
a rule of the common law.75 Yet, the question of reasonableness to employees was nevertheless
addressed in Mountain Timber and in White virtually sua sponte.76
It is possible to read two cases from the Supreme Court’s 1919 term, New York Cent. RR. Co.
v. Bianc,77 and Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer,78 as both endorsing and restricting a muscular
legislative supremacy welded to federalism. In Bianc,79 the Court concluded that a state could
award workers’ compensation benefits for facial or bodily disfigurement even where no impact on
an employee’s earning capacity had been established.80 Noting that “a serious disfigurement of the
face or head reasonably may be regarded as having a direct relation to the injured person’s earning
power, irrespective of its effect upon his mere capacity for work,”81 the Court said,
If a state recognizes or establishes a right of action for compensation to injured
workmen upon grounds not arbitrary or fundamentally unjust, the question whether
the award shall be measured as compensatory damages are measured at common
law, or according to some prescribed scale reasonably adapted to produce a fair
result, is for the state itself to determine.82
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Id. at 234.
The original New York Workers’ Compensation Act provided, in Section 219(a), a death benefit of 1200 times the
daily earnings capped at $3000; 50% of the average weekly wage if totally incapacitated and if partially incapacitated
in the case of partial incapacity the weekly payment shall in no case exceed the difference between the amount of the
average weekly earnings of the workman before the accident and the average weekly amount which he is earning or
is able to earn in the same employment or otherwise after the accident, but shall amount to one-half of such difference.
“In no event shall any compensation paid under this article exceed the damage suffered, nor shall any weekly payment
payable under this article in any event exceed ten dollars a week or extend over more than eight years from the date
of the accident.” Ives, supra., 94 N.E. 431.
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Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). For an exhaustive discussion of this point see John C.P. Goldberg, The
Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L. J.
524, 527 (2005).
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See supra. n.73 and accompanying text; see also the similar statements in White, supra. n.51.
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250 U.S. 596 (1919).
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250 U.S. 400 (1919),
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Id. There were three consolidated cases.
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New York Cent. RR. Co. v. Bianc, supra., 250 U.S. at 601.
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Id.
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Id. at 602 quoting Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer, supra. at 429.
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In the Arizona Copper cases83 the Court rejected employers’ arguments that the Arizona
Employers’ Liability Act deprived them of liberty and property. The employers had objected to
several features of the law, and the Court responded in a manner that could just as easily be applied
to employee benefits as employer defenses:
Some expressions contained in our opinion in the White Case . . . are treated in
argument as if they were equivalent to saying that if a state, in making a legislative
adjustment of employers’ liability, departs from the common-law system of basing
responsibility upon fault, it must confine itself to a limited compensation, measured
and ascertained according to the methods adopted in the compensation acts of the
present day. Of course, nothing of the kind was intended. In a previous part of the
opinion . . . it had been shown that the employer had no constitutional right to
continued immunity from liability in the absence of negligence, nor to have the
fellow servant rule and the rules respecting contributory negligence and assumption
of risk remain unchanged. The statutory plan of compensation for injured workmen
and the dependents of those fatally injured-an additional feature at variance with
the common law-was then upheld; but, of course, without saying that no other
would be constitutional.84
By implication this passage suggests that the Arizona Copper Court would have held, upon
challenge by “injured workmen,” that the statutory plan of compensation for those workmen could
have taken other (more meager) forms without offending the Constitution. Bianc and Arizona
Copper thus seemed to establish that states had very wide latitude in designing workers’
compensation systems, even as each case continued to hint at the need for reasonableness and “fair
results.”85
When the Court decided the constitutionality of compulsory state workers’ compensation
statutes as applied to non-hazardous employments in 1922, in Ward & Gow v. Krinsky,86 it was
not presented with, and did not independently discuss, the adequacy or reasonableness of employee
benefits. In its general defense of compulsory workers’ compensation systems and employee
liability acts, however, the Court said,
A sufficient vindication of compulsory Workmen's Compensation and Employers’
Liability Acts, as it has seemed to this court, is found in the public interest of the
state in the lives and personal security of those who are under the protection of its
laws, from which it follows that, when men are employed in hazardous occupations
for gain, it is within the power of the state to charge the pecuniary losses arising
from disabling or fatal personal injury, to some extent, at least, against the industry
after the manner of casualty insurance, instead of allowing them to rest where they
may happen to fall, upon the particular injured employees or their dependents, and
to this end to require that the employer—he who organizes and directs the
enterprise, hires the workmen, fixes the wages, sets a price upon the product,
receives the gross proceeds, pays the costs and the losses, and takes for his reward
83

Arizona Copper Co., supra., 250 U.S. at 400. There were five consolidated cases.
Id. at 429.
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See supra. n.82.
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the net profits, if any—shall make or secure to be made such compensation as
reasonably may be prescribed, to be paid in the event of the injury or death of one
of those employed, instead of permitting the entire risk to be assumed by the
individuals immediately affected. In general, as in the New York law, provisions
for compulsory compensation are made to apply only to those employed in
hazardous occupations, where it may be contemplated by both parties in advance
that sooner or later some of those employed probably will sustain accidental injury
in the course of the employment, but where nobody can know in advance which
particular employees or how many will be the victims, or how serious will be the
injuries.
Krinsky, while offering a much more sophisticated economic justification for compulsory
workers’ compensation, even as applied to nonhazardous employment, again discussed liability as
“such compensation as reasonably may be prescribed” by the state. Throughout the decade, the
Court accepted—in White, in Bianc, and now in Krinsky—that the New York schedule of benefits
was fair, or adequate, or reasonable. But why?
Seemingly uncritical acceptance of workers’ compensation employee benefit levels by courts
was not likely the by-product of lack of political controversy, however. Benefit levels were in fact
controversial throughout the United States during the period of the Supreme Court’s acceptance
of the system.87 In an influential text on the origins of workers’ compensation, The Prelude to the
Welfare State, Price Fishback and Shawn Kantor devoted a chapter to American political struggles
over benefit levels as workers’ compensation statutes were being implemented in various states.
The conclusion of these scholars is that, as workers’ compensation evolved in its nascent decades,
benefit levels were influenced by workers, employers, and social reformers. “[H]ow workers’
compensation benefits varied across states depended on the relative strength of the interest groups
and the economic factors that influenced their demands.”88 This is what one would expect, leaving
to one side doubts about widespread employee participation in the process (if nothing else, workers
were voters).89 The benefit level debate must have proceeded from baselines, however. Where did
the baselines originate? Although this Part has shown that the Court broadly approved workers’
compensation statutes in a handful of states, White, arising from powerful and influential New
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George Young, a Wyoming representative perhaps echoing some national sentiment, was not happy with firstdecade-of-the-20th century benefit levels in Wyoming:
The workingmen of Wyoming want a workman’s compensation law. They naturally want a law that
carries the very highest possible benefits. I want to say now that it is my honest conviction that the
benefits specified in this act are too low. It is true that we have no adequate figures at hand, that
apply particularly to our State, that would let us accurately base a demand for higher rates with the
certain knowledge that the fund accumulated would pay for them. It is because of this, and because
of the fact that presenting a demand for higher rates of compensation would open the way for all
sorts of amendments to the bill, that I make this statement. The time for consideration of the bill is
short; amendments here might encourage amendments elsewhere; opposition might be excited to
the measure, and I want no act of mine to endanger the passage of the bill . . .
Wyoming House Journal, 13th Leg. 329 (statement of Rep. Young)
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PRICE V. FISHBACK AND SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE, supra. at 173
Id.
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York, was the Court’s first opinion, and was evidently the touchstone for all that followed. Why
was the Court convinced that the New York system was reasonable and adequate?90

III.

1917 CONTEXT

This Part discusses the social context in which the just discussed, seminal workers’
compensation cases were being decided. Specifically, it will show the constant interplay between
relatively unknown private actors and state workmen’s compensation commissions appointed by
governors and legislators during the first decade of the twentieth century to make
recommendations concerning workers’ compensation systems. The Part will also show that
canvassing of European workers’ compensation systems by private actors crystalized options and
was substantially responsible for creating the New York proto-statute that was ultimately ruled
constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in White.
A. Background
It is easy for 21st century readers to underappreciate the magnitude of the late 19th and early
20 century workers’ compensation project. As John Fabian Witt has noted, during this period
policy makers and academics were involved in a “vibrant transatlantic dialogue” on industrial
accidents.91 Why transatlantic? Because several European workers’ compensation statutes were
already in existence beginning in the late 19th century, and Europe had a substantial influence on
the development of American workers’ compensation systems.92
Witt also notes that,
th

In the first decade of the twentieth century, as workmen’s compensation statutes
became a topic of serious of conversation in American legislatures, teams of
reformers and academics travelled to Europe under the aegis of such organizations
as the Russell Sage Foundation, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the
Department of Labor to see for themselves how other nations dealt with accident
compensation.93
This article contends that it was dialogue between the teams Witt mentions and state
commissions that created benchmarks of adequacy against which the Supreme Court considered
the New York statute, sub silentio. The teams had as a stated objective creation of a uniform law
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Part of the equation probably has to do with the arguments parties were not advancing because of the procedural
posture of cases. As the lead cases demonstrate, litigation was usually launched by companies challenging the scope
of the state’s police power. The question of employee remedies and benefits would not have been featured.
Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable that employers could have aggressively pursued theories of employee benefit
inadequacy as a strategy for scuttling the scheme. The Court demonstrated in both White and Mountain Timber that it
was willing to consider such arguments. See supra. n.73 and accompanying text.
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JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE
REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 9, n.38 (HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2009).
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Joseph LaDou, The European Influence on Workers’ Compensation Reform in the United States, 10 ENVIRON.
HEALTH 103 (2011) available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3267658/.
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Id. at 9, n.42.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3238456

that could be tested against constitutional challenge in impact litigation.94 Model workers’
compensation statutes were in fact drafted and nationally circulated,95 though only after the first
major workers’ compensation statute had been struck by the New York Court of Appeals.96 The
process resembled a regulatory negotiation resulting in consensus standards.97 Broad, extra-legal
negotiation was not unknown to policy makers of the early 20th century, and an apt comparison
could be made to mostly private labor-management negotiation of the federal Railway Labor Act
in 1926.98 Viewed in this way, White and its progeny were nascent “deference” cases in which
informally-appointed, quasi-political commissions played the role of ad hoc expert agencies
involved in analysis of a national problem during a period preceding the mature federal
administrative state.99 It is true, of course, that deferring to experts reveals only what is reasonable
and not what is unreasonable, and that is perhaps a good way to explain some of the modern
disutility of White. Still, glimpsing the nature of expert opinion of the 1910s provide insight into
the contemporaneous scope of reasonableness which probably influenced the Court.
B. The 1909/1910 National Conference on Workmen’s Compensation for Industrial
Accidents: The Minnesota Initiative
The first of the important expert bodies of the decade was the National Conference on
Workmen’s Compensation for Industrial Accidents. On July 29, 1909, a conference on workers’
compensation was convened in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The announcement of the conference
sent to invitees stated,
You are, invited to be present at The Marlborough-Blenheim, at Atlantic City, July
29-31 and take part in a conference with the various State and Government officials
and others interested in legislation changing the basis of recovery, for injuries
received in the course of employment from that of negligence or fault of the
employer, to that of risk of the industry or insurance; at which conference the
persons whose names appear under the several subjects will be asked to lead the
discussions along the respective lines appearing in the program herein. You are

NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS, PROCEEDINGS, 1st,
Atlantic City, New Jersey 1909, at 51-52 available at
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=inu.32000000094435;view=1up;seq=9
95
See e.g. PROCEEDINGS, THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS,
Chicago, Illinois 1910 available at https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951002082754.
96
See supra. at n.38.
97
For a discussion of the ways in which private negotiations can resemble regulatory negotiation see Philip J. Harter,
Negotiating Regulations, A Cure for Malaise, 71 Geo. L. Rev. 1, 35 (1982).
98
See Laurence Scott Zakson, Railway Labor Legislation 1888-1930: A Legal History of Congressional Labor
relations Policy, 20 RUTGERS L. J. 317, 362 n.247 (1989) (describing six months of conferencing between
representatives of labor and management which produced a proposal that would become in all important respects the
Railway Labor Act of 1926).
99
This conceptualization gives renewed emphasis to the excellent title of Price Fishback and Shawn Kantor’s
influential book cited throughout this article: “Prelude to the Welfare State.” One might add, “Prelude to the
Administrative State.”
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requested to extend this invitation to such persons as can contribute knowledge on
the subject.100
The Chair of the Minnesota Employees’ Commission signed the announcement.101 A second
such conference was held on January 20, 1910, and a third on June 10, 1910.102 One could argue,
based upon these conferences, that the Minnesota Commission was a prime mover in national
workers’ compensation dialogue. During the June 1910 conference, for example, attended by
representatives of state workers’ compensation commissions or delegations from Minnesota,
Wisconsin, New York (Crystal Eastman appeared, among others), Illinois, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Maryland, and Connecticut,103 the Minnesota Commission outlined its workers’
compensation process to date. The Commission explained that after identifying the need for a
national workers’ conversation at a Minnesota State Bar Association meeting in 1908, the Bar
Association created a Minnesota Commission comprised of various stakeholders from within the
state.104 The newly-minted Commission widely canvassed a range of opinion on the failings of the
tort system to remedy workplace injuries. Eventually, the Commission, with the assistance of
various commentators, drew up a Model Code, which it distributed and discussed at the June 10
meeting.
The Code would apply to all employers and not just those engaged in extrahazardous
industries.105 For injuries resulting in immediate death, death occurring within five years, or total
incapacity of five years or longer, the Code would have provided sixty-percent of wages the injured
worker was receiving at time of injury, for a period of five years, up to a maximum of threethousand dollars.106 For incapacity lasting fewer than five years, the Code would have provided
sixty-percent of the pre-injury wage, or sixty-percent of the wage-loss occasioned by the injury,
depending on whether incapacity was total or partial.107 In addition, the Code would have provided
for a schedule of supplemental benefits when certain parts of the body were injured: forty percent
of pre-injury wages for five years for loss of both feet, both hands, or a foot and a hand;108 fifteen
percent of pre-injury wages for five years for loss of a foot, a hand or an eye.109 Recovery for
“maiming” of the scheduled body parts could be adjusted proportionally. 110 But limits applied to
the stacking of benefits: in no instance could all benefits exceed what the injured worker had been
earning in wages at the time of injury; and in no event could all benefits received exceed five
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS, PROCEEDINGS, 1st,
Atlantic City, New Jersey 1909 available at
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=inu.32000000094435;view=1up;seq=9. (hereinafter PROCEEDINGS, FIRST
NATIONAL CONFERENCE).
101
Id.
102
PROCEEDINGS, THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS,
Chicago Illinois 1910 available at https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951002082754. (hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS, THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE).
103
See PROCEEDINGS, THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE at 10-38.
104
Id. at 33-34.
105
Id. at 40.
106
Id. Roughly $80,000 in 2018 dollars. This and all upcoming inflation conversions for weekly benefit amounts are
based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation Calculator available at https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl
107
Id. Wage-loss benefits would be obtained by subtracting post-injury wages from the pre-injury wage and taking
sixty-percent of the difference.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.at 41.
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thousand dollars.111 The Code would not have provided for payment of medical expenses incurred
as a result of work-related injuries.
The treatment of extrahazardous employments was novel. Although several of the earliest
workers’ compensation statutes in the United States—including New York’s—were elective, or
voluntary, for non-extrahazardous employers, the Code would have defined hazardous
employment sufficiently broadly that any employer experiencing an accident was essentially
hazardous. Thus, as a practical matter, the Code would have been compulsory for most employers
and employees. Additionally, the remedies for work-related injuries as defined in the Code would
have been exclusive:
Sec. 4. Repeal of other liabilities. The right to compensation and the remedy
therefor, as herein speciﬁed, shall be in lieu of all other causes of action for such
injuries and awards upon which they are based as to all persons covered by this act,
whether formerly authorized or allowed by, or as the result of, either state, statute
or common law, and no other compensation, right of action, damages or liability,
either for such injuries or for any result thereof, either in favor of those covered by
this act or against such employer based on state law, shall hereafter be allowed for
such injuries to any persons or for any of the injuries covered by this act so long as
this law shall remain in force, unless, and then only to the extent, that this law shall
be speciﬁcally amended.112
In reflecting upon the proposed Code, it should be born in mind that the Minnesota
Commission had reportedly gathered information and data from the states of Massachusetts,
Illinois, and New York; it sought but could not obtain relevant data from various charities, unions,
or (at least at that time) from the National Association of Manufacturers; it wrote to conservative
labor leader Samuel Gompers, who, interestingly, had not yet adequately studied the matter; it
wrote to radical labor leader Eugene Debs, who had studied the matter more comprehensively than
Gompers and provided comparative information about international workers’ compensation
systems; and it had communicated with industrialist Andrew Carnegie, who said he preferred the
English system.113 The Minnesota Commission was aware of the various constitutional challenges
likely to be raised, and addressed them in its report.114
The Minnesota Commission made direct contact with the Russell Sage Foundation
investigators who were studying, during the summer of 1908, the design of European workers’
compensation systems. After establishing the Russell Sage contacts, the Minnesota Commission
invited the investigators to the conference of July 1909, thereby sharing with state officials, and
others, details of the operation of European and British Commonwealth systems,115 some of which
had been in existence since 1877.116 Dr. Lee K. Frankel, one of the principal Russell Sage
Foundation investigators, candidly stated at the July 1909 conference:
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Id. About $132,600 in 2018 dollars.
Id. at 41.
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114
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PROCEEDINGS, FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE, see especially testimony of Dr. Lee K. Frankel at 231-244. Frankel
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I hope that the outcome of this meeting will be some effort toward uniformity in
legislation. You will notice that I have refrained from expressing any opinion as to
whether any of the foreign systems are adaptable to the United States. My own
thought is that between the compulsory scheme in Germany and the purely
compensatory scheme in England we shall find some sort of a mean that is
adaptable to and that can be practically administered in the United States. We shall
probably find that such a scheme will be adaptable not only to one but to all of our
states. Except so far as their geographical situation is concerned, and so far as there
may be certain industries in certain localities, there are not sufficient differences
between our states to warrant us in having different legislation in each state. If this
meeting can do nothing else than to get together on some uniform basis, it would
be doing a great deal. I thoroughly believe that if we are ever to obtain such
legislation here, it will have to be done by a concurrence of opinion on the part of
such commissions as are already created, so that each one shall be able to
recommend to their respective legislatures a draft of a bill with the statement that
this draft has been accepted by the commissions of other states. The moral force of
such a statement in the beginning of new legislation cannot be over-estimated.117
The statement strongly suggests that from the beginning of serious national deliberation on
workers’ compensation—involving state commissions,118 academics, NGOs, and insurance
companies119—national uniformity was an important goal, and European systems were to be
studied closely and emulated wherever possible. The statement also suggests that, despite broad
conversation on several European laws, the German and English systems were quickly the leading
candidates for emulation. From the point of view of employee benefits,120 what were the
differences between the German and English systems? A summary comparison prepared by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 1917, helps to explain the features of the two systems as they would
have existed in around the first decade of the twentieth century, when the National Conferences
were being held.121
1. The German System122
The German Act was first enacted in 1884, and then amended several times. The Code of 1911
compensated injuries by accident in the course of the employment, causing death, or disability for
more than three days, unless caused intentionally by the injured worker. Compensation could be
117

Id. at 243.
Id. at 1-2. Present at the first conference were members of the state commissions (or other state officials) from
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Washington D.C., and New York.
119
Id. The list of attendees at the first conference included executives or representatives from Aetna Life Insurance
Co., Travelers Insurance Co., General Accident Insurance Corporation, Fidelity and Casualty Co., United States
Casualty Co., Ocean accident and Guaranty Co., Maryland Casualty Co., and Liability Insurance.
120
Structurally, the two systems were very different in that the German system compensated in an integrated manner
sickness, workplace injury, and disability within an overall social insurance scheme while the British system was
focused exclusively on workplace injuries. A full discussion of the many differences between the two systems is
beyond the scope of this article.
121
Comparisons based on summaries compiled in U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES, Bulletin No. 203, supra.
at 316-317.
122
Id. at 316.
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denied or reduced if injury was sustained while the worker was committing an illegal act. A variety
of industries were covered, and while most were extrahazardous, many were not. Covered
individuals included all “workmen and apprentices,” and certain government officials.
Importantly, voluntary coverage of employers not under the jurisdiction of the law could be
approved by the State, upon request. The statute covered medical and surgical treatment for ninetyone days following the injury. Benefit payments from the beginning of the fourth to the ninetyfirst day were provided by sick-benefit funds, to which employers contributed one-third and
employees two-thirds. From the beginning of twenty-ninth day post-injury, to the ninety-first day,
payments were increased by one-third, solely at the expense of the involved employer. After the
ninety-first day, and in case of death from injuries, the expense of the injury was borne by
employers’ associations, which were supported by the contributions of employers (but not
employees).
Compensation for death included:
(a) Funeral benefits of one-fifteenth of annual earnings of deceased, but not less
than 50 marks ($11.90).
(b) Pensions to dependent heirs not exceeding 60 per cent of annual earnings of the deceased .
. .123
Compensation for disability included:
(a) Free medical and surgical treatment paid during the first 13 weeks of incapacity by sick
benefit funds and afterwards by employers’ associations.
(b) For temporary or permanent total disability, 50% of daily wages of persons similarly
employed, but not exceeding 3 marks (71 cents), paid by sick benefit funds from beginning of
fourth day to end of fourth week; from fifth to end of thirteenth week, above allowance by sick
benefit fund, plus 16 1/3% contributed by the employer directly; after 13 weeks, 66 2/3% of
average annual earnings of injured person paid by employers associations.
(c) For complete helplessness necessitating attendance, payments could be increased to 100%
of annual earnings.
(d) For partial disability, a corresponding reduction in payments was made.
(e) If annual earnings [from benefits payments] exceeded 1,800 marks ($428.40),124 only onethird of the excess was considered in computing pensions.
Benefit payments could be revised whenever a change in condition of an injured worker
occurred.
Disputes were settled by the “superior insurance offices,” composed of Government officials
and an equal number of representatives of employers and employees.
2. The English System125
123

Apportionment between heirs is omitted in this exposition.
$11,363 in 2018 dollars.
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STATUTES, Bulletin No. 203. supra. at 317.
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The English Act was first enacted in 1897, and the Russell Sage investigators would have been
doing their work after the passage of a major amendment in 1906, which went into effect in 1907.
The law compensated injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment,
which caused death, or disabled a workman for at least one week from earning full wages.
Compensation was not paid when injury resulted from the serious and willful misconduct of a
worker, unless it caused death or serious and permanent disability. “Any employment” was
covered as was “any person regularly employed for the purposes of the employer’s trade or
business whose compensation was less than £250 ($1,216.63) per year (persons engaged
exclusively in manual labor were not subject to this limitation).126 The Act applied to civilian
persons employed under the Crown (government employees) as if the employer were a private
person. The entire cost of compensation rested upon the employer.

Compensation for death included:
(a) A sum equal to three years’ earnings, but not less than £150 ($729.98) nor more than £300
($1,459.95),127 to those entirely dependent on the earnings of the deceased.
(b) A sum of less than the above amount if deceased left persons partially dependent on his or
earnings, with the amount to be agreed upon by the parties or fixed by arbitration.
(c) Reasonable expenses of medical attendance and burial, but not to exceed £10 ($48.67),128
if deceased left no dependents.
Compensation for disability:
(a) A weekly payment during incapacity of not more than 50% of an employee’s average
weekly earnings during previous twelve months, but not exceeding £1 ($4.87)129 per week; if
incapacity lasted less than two weeks no payment was required for the first week.
(b) A weekly payment during partial disability, not exceeding the difference between the
employee's average weekly earnings before injury and the average amount which he or she was
earning, or was able to earn, after injury.
(c) Minor persons’ earnings were fully covered during incapacity, but weekly benefits could
not exceed 10 shillings ($2.43).130
(d) A sum sufficient to purchase a life annuity of 75% annual value of weekly payments could
be substituted, on application of the employer, for weekly payments after six months; but other
arrangements for redemption of weekly payments could be made by agreement between employer
and employee.
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Roughly $32,300 in 2018 dollars.
Not less than $19,344 or more than $38,725 in 2018 dollars.
128
About $1291 in 2018 dollars.
129
About $129 in 2018 dollars.
130
About $64 in 2018 dollars.
127

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3238456

Weekly payments could be revised at the request of either party, under regulations issued by
the secretary of state.
Employers could make contracts with employees for substitution of a scheme of compensation,
benefit, or insurance in place of the provisions of the act, if officials certified the scheme was not
less favorable to the workmen and their dependents than the provisions of the act, and that a
majority of the employer’s workmen were favorable to the substitute. The employer was then liable
only for compliance with the provisions of the scheme.
In case of an employer’s bankruptcy, the amount of compensation due under the act, up to
£100 ($486.65) in any individual case, was classed as a preferred claim.
Questions arising under the law were settled either by committee representatives of the
employer and the employer’s workmen, by an arbitrator selected by the two parties, or, if the
parties could not agree, by the judge of the relevant county court, who could appoint an arbitrator
to act in the judge’s place.
Thus, the German and English systems paid indemnity benefits of between 50% and 66 2/3%
of the average weekly wage of the injured or deceased worker. The German system appears to
have been substantially more generous than the English system with respect to medical benefits;
and it is possible that those who favored the English system did so for this reason. Indeed, this may
be understating the case because the English Act of 1906 contained no provision for payment of
work injury-related medical benefits,131 while the German system typically provided full medical
benefits for the duration of a disability caused by an accident.132 Eventually, in 1911, the English
enacted a national insurance law, the National Insurance Act 1911,133 championed by David Lloyd
George, drawing as inspiration Bismarck’s 1884 comprehensive code, of which the German
workers’ compensation system under discussion was a part.134
The German system also appeared to treat beneficiaries of workers killed by work-related
injuries more favorably than did the English system.

C. The 1911 National Association of Manufacturers Report
The Minnesota Commission was not alone in investigating the feasibility of implementing
workers’ compensation in the United States. The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)
was also directly involved in researching workers’ compensation systems, a process it was carrying
out just as the Minnesota Commission was reporting findings in connection with its investigations.
131

6 Edw. VII, c.58, First Schedule, as reproduced in 2 HARRY B. BRADBURY 1735 (2nd. Ed. 1914).
GERMAN WORKMEN’S INSURANCE CODE, BOOK THREE, SECTION 2, ART. 555(1), as reproduced in 2 HARRY B.
BRADBURY 2028.
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See JOHN HENRY WATT, THE LAW RELATING TO NATIONAL INSURANCE: WITH AN EXPLANATORY INTRODUCTION
76 (Stevens and Sons 1913) (defining covered individuals as all persons employed). After 1911, there was no need to
pay for medical benefits under the British workers’ compensation statutes.
134
Although beyond the scope of this article, the German code was actually three laws in one: the Health Insurance
of Workers Law of 1883 (covering illness); the Accident Insurance Law of 1884 (work injuries); and the Old Age and
Invalidity Law of 1889 (pensions and long-term total disability). ERIC SOLSTEN, ED., GERMANY: A COUNTRY STUDY
200 (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress 1996).
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To this end, that organization dispatched Fred G. Schwedtman and James E. Emery on a four
months’ investigation of Europe, where the two men personally visited the countries of England,
Germany, France, Austria, Hungary Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and Italy. 135 Each of these
countries had already established workers’ compensation systems.136 The team produced an
exhaustive report, which was adopted by the NAM. The document ran two hundred and sixty-nine
pages, and, among other things, made an extended comparison of the English and German systems.
As significant as the findings and conclusions reached by the drafters of the document turned out
to be, the sheer number of sources relied upon to generate those findings and conclusions rendered
it authoritative. Like the Russell Sage report, the NAM report resembled an expert governmental
document. Many experts were consulted in the course of its creation, particularly from
Germany.137 Moreover, the report claimed to have surveyed ten-thousand employers in advance
of its issuance.138 The cover pages of the report bore the names of individuals drawn from an
extremely broad swath of American industrialism.139 Notably, the report reflected, in those same
cover pages, the name of J.M. Glenn, Director of the Russell Sage Foundation, who was also a
member of NAM’s “Advisory Board of the Committee on Industrial Indemnity Insurance.”140 A
summary of the report’s findings is enough to capture the depth of the NAM’s deliberations:
•

•
•
•
•

Limited compensation for work-related personal injuries already existed in the
major European countries and British Colonies based on the recognition that
industrial accidents are often simply unavoidable and the cost for those
accidents should not be born exclusively by the workman but should be treated
as a cost of production and spread accordingly.141
Handling workplace injuries leads to bitterness and it was in the public interest
to expedite the process.142
Self-inflicted injury should result in reduced or no compensation143
All employments should be included in the system144
While the European systems were not perfect, they worked well enough to
provide conclusive evidence that the general approach of workers’
compensation socially, economically, and industrially advantageous145
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FRED G. SCHWEDTMAN AND JAMES E. EMERY, ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND RELIEF: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE
SUBJECT IN EUROPE, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO ENGLAND AND GERMANY: TOGETHER WITH RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA xxiii available at
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015030424603;view=1up;seq=29.
136
See generally, supra., U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION
STATUTES, Bulletin No. 203.
137
See SCHWEDTMAN AND EMERY, ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND RELIEF, Appendix I, 273-327 (reproducing
approximately twenty-five uniformly positive letters from prominent German authorities on their impressions of the
operation of the German system).
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•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

The proposed system could not work without vigorous accident prevention and
provision to injured workers of first-aid without risk of diminished benefits146
Professional administrators were necessary to carry out the requirements of
workers’ compensation acts and to adjust practices where necessary147
The German Empire had been the most successful in applying workers’
compensation because of its careful compilation of statistics and scientific study
of accident avoidance (though many details of its administration were neither
applicable nor desirable148
The chief principles of the German system could be adopted in the states “by
voluntary action or through permissive legislation and, in a large degree
compelled by statute.”149
The basis of workers’ compensation systems in Europe was compensation for
loss of work capacity and was not based on fault150
If every employer became a limited insurer in law, it should also become an
insurer in fact, and the obligation to pay into a common insurance fund should
be a substitute for legal liability151
Limited compensation through insurance was most successfully obtained
through creation of a fund administered by the state, or a fund supervised by
the state, or through voluntary mutual associations, or in private insurance
associations152
Employees should pay a small portion towards maintenance of the insurance
fund to discourage fraudulent claims and encourage mutual cooperation153
A single liability (in other than exceptional cases) should apply and a workers’
compensation system should discourage all other legal liability154
The principle of compensation should be universal, or it places unequal burdens
on classes of employers and denies compensation to “vast classes of”
employees155
Compensation in Europe was not regarded as a complete indemnity but as a
“substantial expression of the impairment of earning capacity”156
The better systems neither allowed nor intended to “recompense trivial injuries
nor breed paupers by corrupting thrift” and, accordingly, waiting periods157
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•
•
•

were desirable, though employers should provide medical first aid during those
waiting periods158
The system should feature cheap and expeditious adjustment of claims along
the lines of European systems of arbitration, subject only to questions of law
that may arise for the courts159
Any application of workers’ compensation in the United States must be
substantially uniform or it would produce harmful conditions160
NAM was aware that significant legal challenges to the system would occur but
encouraged voluntary actions by private employers and implementation by
states of voluntary schemes of compensation until legal questions had been
resolved

The NAM report concluded:
Successful legislative action throughout Europe has been preceded by deliberate
and painstaking investigation, extending in many instances through years of effort
in the collection and comparison of information. We are fortunately able to avail
ourselves of the most practical features of the Old World's labor and experience.
But we should make a start for ourselves here and now, providing at once for the
accumulation in our respective states of that accurate information which is a basic
necessity for intelligent action. Having once determined upon a rational policy of
compensation, we believe rapid progress can be made in giving it appropriate legal
form and adapting it to our customs and institutions. We should act now and as
rapidly as is compatible with the greatness and complexity of the subject and its
intimate relation to the prosperity of the employers and workmen of our country.161
The preference for the German system is palpable from the report’s findings. The next section
discusses developments following the groundwork laid by the Minnesota Commission and the
NAM report.

D. The Role of the National Civic Federation
Following the investigations and reporting of the Minnesota Commission Initiative and the
NAM group, the National Civic Federation (“NCF”) was instrumental in actually drafting early
workers’ compensation bills. The NCF was organized in around 1900, and was initially formed
around a program of conciliation and mediation between large unions and corporations.162 It was
led by executives of very large companies and comprised of business, labor, and public interests.163
Samuel Gompers, for example. was a member of the NCF, and the organization had the reputation
158
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for both opposing the spread of unionism and supporting “responsible” unions.164 The NCF’s
membership was diverse, enormous, and influential:
By 1903 almost one-third of the 367 corporations with a capitalization of more than
$10,000,000 were represented in the National Civic Federation, as were sixteen of
the sixty-seven largest railroads in the United States. Labor was also represented
by its top leaders. Samuel Gompers was the original First Vice President of the
Federation, a position he retained until his death in 1925. John Mitchell of the
United Mine Workers was an active member and fulltime head of the Trade
Agreements Department from 1908 to 1911. The heads of the major railroad
brotherhoods and many A.F.L. international unions were also on the executive
committee.165
The reason this matters is that by 1908 the NCF had established an Industrial Insurance
Commission which, while initially somewhat inactive, became much more active in 1909, as NCF
members came to strongly embrace the principles of workers’ compensation.166 August Belmont
Jr., the famous financier, was appointed to head the NCF’s “Department on Compensation for
Industrial Accidents and their Prevention,” and, thereafter, the NCF began to aggressively draft
workmen’s compensation bills.167 Shortly after being assigned to the NCF’s Department of
Compensation, Belmont appointed a bill-drafting committee headed by former New York
Commissioner of Labor, and conservative lawyer, P. Tecumseh Sherman.168 Sherman thought the
German workers’ compensation system was best, but surmised that, because of that system’s
comprehensive nature, it would both generate hostility and face constitutional hurdles.169
Sherman’s original draft bill was circulated nationally to “the governors and legislators of all states
that had appointed commissions to study compensation, and governors of other states were urged
to consider such legislation.”170 The bill, which set out an elective, or voluntary, workers’
compensation system for all but extrahazardous employments, elicited opposition from a variety
of outside actors. The president of U.S. Steel, Raynall Bolling, for example, favored a universally
compulsory system.171 Socialists and progressives favored state, rather than private, insurance
funds, and wanted higher benefits.172 Even within the NCF, Hugh Mercer, who had served as Chair
at the second National (Minnesota Commission) Conference in 1910, was an opponent of
Sherman’s draft.173 But Sherman thought Mercer’s competing bill (which had been substantially
influenced by the progressive Russell Sage Foundation investigators) a radical, expensive
164

Id. citing correspondence between Ralph M. Easley, Isaac N. Seligman, Gertrude Beeks, Charles D. Lithgrow and
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preference of only ten states, and believed it should not be brought forward in the interest of
supporting only a bill that would be widely accepted and become nationally uniform.174 By
December 1910, the NCF was receiving regular requests for a bill from governors and legislators
all over the country.175 In January 1911, Sherman’s bill was approved by the Executive Council of
the NCF.176 Following the amendment of the New York constitution to allow for a workers’
compensation law, a debate between competing replacement bills ensued in the New York
legislature in which the NCF bill, styled the “McClelland bill,” substantially prevailed.177 Thus a
direct line can be traced from the Minnesota Commission, to the NAM report, to the NCF, and
finally to the version of the New York workers’ compensation statute that was upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court in White.

E. What Did the New York Statute Upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court Provide?178
The New York legislature enacted the statute eventually upheld in White on December 16,
1913, and the law went into effect on July 1, 1914. It compensated accidental injuries arising out
of and in course of employment, and disease or infection “naturally and unavoidably” resulting
from accidental injuries, causing disability for more than two weeks, or death, unless caused by
the willful intention of the injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or
another, or by his intoxication while on duty. As Sherman suggested, the Act was compulsory only
with respect to “hazardous employments,” which included construction, maintenance and
operation of steam and street railroads; telegraph, telephone, and other electrical construction,
installation, operation, or repair; foundries, machine shops, and power plants; stone cutting,
crushing, grinding, or dressing; manufactures, tanneries, laundries, printing, and bookbinding;
shipbuilding and repair, and the use of vessels in intrastate commerce; work in mines, quarries,
tunnels, subways, shaft sinking, etc.; engineering work, and the construction, repair, and
demolition of buildings and bridges; lumbering, draying, loading, and unloading, ice harvesting,
freight and passenger elevators, etc.
All employees in covered industries were eligible, farm laborers and domestic servants were
explicitly excluded from coverage by the statute. Public employment was explicitly covered under
the statute. The entire cost of the insurance was born by the employer.
Compensation for death:
(a) $100 for funeral expenses.179
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(b) To a widow or dependent widower alone, 30% of wages of deceased, 10% additional for
each child under 18; dependent orphans under 18 received 15%, and dependent parents, brothers,
or sisters received 15%; aggregate payments were in no case to exceed 66 2/3%.
(c) Payments to widows or widowers ceased upon death or remarriage or when dependence of
widower ceased, with two years’ compensation on remarriage; payments to children, brothers, and
sisters ceased at 18, and to parents when dependence ceased. In computing the above benefits no
wages more than $100 monthly were considered.180
Compensation for disability:
(a) Medical and surgical treatment and hospital services for 60 days, with costs to be approved
by the workers’ compensation commission.
(b) For total disability, 66 2/3% of wages during continuance.
(c) For partial disability, 66 2/3% of wage loss; for specified permanent partial disabilities
(mutilations, etc.), 66 2/3% of wages for fixed periods; there was a separate provision for
disfigurements.
The foregoing payments could not be less than $5 nor more than $15 per week,181 except that
for certain “maimings” the aggregate maximum benefit was capped at $20.
Awards could be reviewed, at any time, and ended or increased or decreased within the limits
fixed depending on the disability status of the claimant.

F. Assessing the Range of Reasonableness
The statute enacted by New York in 1913 was at the conservative (it must be said), English
Act end of a workers’ compensation spectrum that had been exhaustively studied on a national
level since 1908. The indemnity benefit level, though generally capped at $15 per week, resembled
the structure of the English Act and, for lower income workers, paid 15% more of the average
weekly wage than the English Act. Moreover, unlike the situation under many modern American
workers’ compensation statutes, compensation was paid for the duration of a disability, and was
not terminated arbitrarily after a certain period.182 Deceased workers’ survivors were compensated
on an ongoing basis, not as comprehensively as under the German system, but comparably to the
English Act. Though the New York Act failed to pay for ongoing medical treatment necessitated
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The maximum base wage rate was about $2,500 in 2018 dollars, which means that the maximum benefit (regardless
how distributed) was about $1,667 per month.
181
In 2018 dollars, $126 per month would have been the minimum benefit and $378 the maximum benefit. The $20
maximum benefit where a maiming was involved would have been about $504 per week in 2018 dollars.
182
Compare John F. Burton, Report of the National Commission on Workmen’s Compensation Laws, 1 WORKMEN’S
COMP. L. REV. 361, 363 (1974) (“The main issue for permanent total disability benefits concerns the total sum allowed
and the duration of payments. Although there is wide agreement that payments for permanent total disability should
be paid for life, we found that 19 States in 1972 failed to comply with that recommended standard. In 15 States,
duration of payments was limited to 10 years or less and in 11 States the gross sum payable was less than $25,000,
which is less than the average full-time worker in the United States earns in four years.”).
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by a work-related injury, the same was true of the English Act, and arguably of the German law.183
Ultimately, the New York workers’ compensation statute looked like many workers’
compensation laws throughout the world as they had evolved by the early 20th century. And more
importantly than how the statute seems retrospectively to a twenty-first century observer, it
undoubtedly seemed reasonable (and like good policy) to a broad swath of contemporaneous
experts.184 The Supreme Court’s condemnation of the New York statute (or its successors in other
states) as unreasonable would have meant, as a practical matter, condemnation of the very idea of
workers’ compensation, with few alternative ideas in circulation as to how to replace the
insufficient tort system.
The Washington statute upheld in Mountain Timber provided fixed monthly benefits for both
disability and death that were not based on a percentage of the average weekly wage. 185 The
Arizona statute upheld in the Arizona Copper cases provided total disability benefits based on
fifty-percent of injured worker’s average semimonthly earnings and, in the case of partial benefits,
for only fifty-percent of injury related reduction in wages, with a lifetime cap on all disability
benefits of four-thousand dollars.186 None of the early statutes provided work-injury medical
benefits beyond sixty days. Was this an adequate exchange for the total relinquishment of tort
rights? As discussed in Part II, the Supreme Court made no attempt to compare, in quantitative
terms, the magnitude of benefits. One might infer that anything below fifty-percent of the average
wage for ongoing disability might have been problematic for the Court. The complete absence of
a death benefit might not have passed muster under the bargain.187 The important point is that the
183

Workers in each country were paid for work-related medical injury care under a national health insurance law, and
at the time the Minnesota Commission and NAM investigators were doing their work England had not yet enacted
such a law. See supra. n.133 & 134 and accompanying text.
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Following the Ives decision, the New York Commission (independently of the NCF) aggressively reopened its
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commission in one direction. Inquiries were sent to 1,942 employers reporting accidents to the State
department of labor, to 975 reporting accidents to the public-service commission, and to the
presidents of 2,331 labor organizations in the State. Several statistical studies were made as to the
economic results of accidents and proceedings at law with reference to such accidents; also the cost
of industrial accidents to employers and the distribution of such costs to hospitals for fees, insurance
premiums, settlements, as damages, etc.
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION STATUTES, Bulletin No.
203, supra. at 25.
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L.1911, C. 74, Sec. 5: In case of death $20 per month to the surviving spouse; $5 per month to each surviving child;
maximum of $35 per month (roughly $900 in 2018 dollars). The same maximum applied to a married injured worker
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2018 dollars) regardless the duration of the disability.
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U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION STATUTES, Bulletin No. 203,
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Here, however, it should be remembered that wrongful death had been extinguished by the common law in the
English case Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808), and had to be revived in that country by Lord
Campbell’s Act. Although also revived by statutory intervention in the United States, there is a good deal of variety
in the statutes, see Frederick Davis, Wrongful Death, 1973 WASH. U. L. Q. 327, 329-331 (1973), and it is difficult to
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Supreme Court’s silence on the scale of benefits speaks volumes to its likely confidence in the
level of sophistication and process that went into creation of the statutes. That sophistication
essentially obviated the need for the Court to make any pronouncements on the importance, or
constitutional status ,of tort rights, and whether those rights could, indeed, simply be swept away.

CONCLUSION
Perhaps some thoughts may now safely be completed. It is unnecessary to say that a state might
(without triggering due process concerns) set aside all rules of employer-employee liability
without providing a “reasonably just substitute,”188 because here, in the New York workers’
compensation statute under consideration, there is a reasonably just substitute. It perhaps may be
doubted whether the state could abolish all rights of action, on the one hand, or all defenses, on
the other, without setting up something adequate in their stead,189 but here something adequate
has been set up in their stead. None of this is to say, that any scale of compensation, however
insignificant, on the one hand, or onerous, on the other, would be supportable,190 but here one need
not reach the question because no such insignificant or onerous scale is present. How did the
Court know the system under consideration was reasonably just, adequate, and provided a scale of
compensation that was neither objectionably insignificant nor onerous? The Court did not say
(other than perhaps to explain how much better off employees were to be out of the tedious,
burdensome, unpredictable litigation system and to not have all the loss of an injury fall on
them).191 But it seems extremely unlikely the Court was unaware that a massive, national
conversation had been underway, during the eight years preceding White, conducted among highranking business leaders, progressive groups, labor unions, and academics, and that the statute
before it was the fruit of those labors. One can perhaps criticize the emerging workers’
compensation model as being excessively pro-business, and not in the interest of workers.192 That
view may presume that injured workers with valid tort claims would have sufficiently frequently
prevailed under strengthening employer liability statutes193 to force employers to invest in safety,
ultimately also inuring to the benefit of the victims of pure accident. Such a conclusion is easy to
reach in hindsight, but probably misapprehends the urgency and intensity of the work injury
say in general terms whether workers’ compensation death benefits in the aggregate represent a windfall or loss to the
survivors of victims of work-related injuries.
188
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189
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problem. Despite all of this, it cannot be doubted that a compromise emerged from significant
transoceanic process, and that the Court understood this was the case.
The problem White leaves to posterity is one of unarticulated boundaries. Boundaries for
employee benefits as a substitute for tort are said to exist, but are never delimited except by
inference. A “substantial expression of the impairment of earning capacity,”194 remains in the eye
of beholder. Of course, as Professor Nachbar recently emphasized, throughout the Lochner era the
Court approached the question of deprivation of vested rights “from the perspective of divining
the nature of the state’s interest in regulation, not the nature of the individual’s rights to liberty and
property,”195 not to mention personal security. Properly understood in constitutional terms, the
foundational workers’ compensation cases decided the power of a state, as limited by the 14th
amendment, to compel employers to provide insurance for their workers. The question of
infringement on individual employee rights was peripheral, though considered. It is difficult to
fault the Court for not precisely answering questions delineating the scope of individual rights (in
this case, the common law tort right to a remedy for personal injury that workers’ compensation
was replacing) when it had not really been asked those questions, and had only just begun to refine
a language of individual fundamental rights.196
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